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ABSTRACT 
Health-related Quality of Life measures have recently been attacked from two directions, both of 
which criticise the preference-based method of evaluating health states they typically incorporate. 
One attack, based on work by Daniel Kahneman and others, argues that ‘experience’ is a better 
basis for evaluation. The other, inspired by Amartya Sen, argues that ‘capability’ should be the 
guiding concept. In addition, opinion differs as to whether health evaluation measures are best 
derived from consultations with the general public, with patients, or with health professionals. And 
there is disagreement about whether these opinions should be solicited individually and 
aggregated, or derived instead from a process of collective deliberation. These distinctions yield a 
wide variety of possible approaches, with potentially differing policy implications. We consider 
some areas of disagreement between some of these approaches. We show that many of the 
perspectives seem to capture something important, such that it may be a mistake to reject any of 
them. Instead we suggest that some of the existing ‘instruments’ designed to measure HR QoLs 
may in fact successfully already combine these attributes, and with further refinement such 
instruments may be able to provide a reasonable reconciliation between the perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Mainstream health economists measure the seriousness of various (ill-)health states 
comparatively: members of the general public are asked about which of various health states they 
would prefer if they were forced to choose between them. The values that emerge from these 
rankings (often referred to as measurements of ‘Health Related Quality of Life’ (HRQoL)) are then 
 used to answer questions of distributing scarce health care resources by incorporating them in 
calculations of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs).1  
 
However, some critics, notably Paul Dolan and Daniel Kahneman, have questioned this 
preference-based methodology. They argue that it is better to focus on people’s actual experiences 
of the various health states in question.2 A different type of criticism argues for some more 
objective form of evaluation. A number of authors, inspired by Amartya Sen, argue for a health 
capability approach, according to which what matters in various health states is how they affect or 
restrict the individual’s capability to function in key respects.3  
 
Alongside the difference in opinion about what constitutes the value of health states, there are 
different views [Page 456 ] about who should be asked to evaluate them. The three possibilities 
most often considered are: (i) the general public (ii) patients (iii) professional experts. Typically, 
these options match the three approaches set out above: the preference approach argues that the 
general public are the appropriate  consultees, while the experience approach consults 
(experienced) patients, and the capability approach elicits the impact on capability to functioning of 
various health conditions from experts (often clinicians). But these pairings are not necessary; one 
might argue, for example, that the public and patients, rather than experts, should evaluate 
capabilities.4 
 
These two distinctions, ‘preferences/experience/capability’ and ‘public/patient/professional’, cut 
across a third. Each group of consultees comprises a number of individuals, whose assessments 
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 may vary. How do we proceed from these individual judgements to a final output? One approach 
uses forms of aggregation, such as averaging. Another approach favours the use of group 
deliberation and discussion, with the aim of reaching a consensus view. Thus we must also 
distinguish between aggregative and deliberative methods of reaching a single judgement. 
Combining these distinctions generates a large number of different potential approaches. If we 
ignore variations as well as possible further ‘hybrid’ proposals, the 3x3x2 classification generates 
eighteen distinct approaches.  
 
The philosophical foundations for the various approaches on offer are quite different and in 
theoretical and philosophical terms the best will be the one that, on reflection, we find to have best 
identified, and argued for, the ‘real’ determinants of the value of health states. Although this 
theoretical debate is of great importance and merits lengthy discussion, it is not the immediate 
concern of this paper. Our purpose, rather, is to consider, by examining some illustrative cases, 
how far the implications in terms of practical policy, differ across the three approaches. In other 
words, the question that we are considering is: what difference does it make, if any, which 
approach we adopt? 
 
This enquiry cannot replace the larger theoretical question, but it can inform us about its urgency.  
For if it turns out that all measures converge in fact on the same (or very similar) judgements, we 
could continue to use existing methods (based on the preferences of the public) to value health, 
while perhaps reserving judgement about whether they are justified in themselves or because they 
happen to coincide in output with the ‘correct’ method, whatever that may be.  
 
There are advantages in retaining use of the standard current methodology if it is possible. This 
methodology, as used, for example by the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence, 
attempts to assess a health intervention in terms of the QALYs that it provides. To do this it asks 
members of the public to express their relative preferences over differing health states. However it 
is a practical impossibility to gain data on all the many thousands of recognized conditions. Instead 
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 health states are analysed using what is called the EQ-5D instrument. This analyses health states 
according to five dimensions. These are ‘mobility’; ‘self-care’; ‘usual activities’; ‘pain/discomfort’; 
and ‘anxiety/depression’; each dimension divided into three levels of severity. The idea is not that 
the EQ-5D instrument provides a conceptual analysis of health, but rather if someone is in an 
adverse health state it will affect them in at least one of these dimensions. Preferences are elicited 
from members of the public among a sufficient number of health states to allow values to be 
inferred for different severity levels in different dimensions, which can then be used to calculate the 
values of health states that have not been investigated directly.  
 
If there is general convergence in results from the different approaches to valuation then the 
advantages of retaining the current methodology are clear. It is well-established, and easier to use 
in some respects than the alternatives. For example, it is easier to obtain large amounts of data 
from the general public than from patients; the public can express preferences over a range of 
hypothetical conditions, whereas patients with experience need to be found for each condition. And 
there are clear methods for converting preferences into the type of cardinal measures needed for 
resource allocation, whereas there is not yet any comparable consensus about how to quantify 
experience or capability.  Accordingly, if there are in practice no, or small, differences between the 
methods of valuation, there is good reason to remain with what we have.  
 
On the other hand, if we find that there are significant differences in outcome when we use the 
different measures, that has important immediate consequences for priority setting. In this 
scenario, the theoretical discussion becomes more pressing. It is instructive, therefore, to start with 
our question of what difference, if any, it makes which measure is used.  
 
Our argument here is that there are significant differences between the measures in some cases, 
yet nevertheless it is possible to retain the current methodology, albeit in substantially modified 
form. To show this we first rehearse existing research that shows significant differences between 
the approaches, and then we consider methods of reconciliation. However we do not attempt to 
discuss all possible approaches to measurement as indicated above. A full comparison of these 
 would be a lengthy and laborious undertaking. Moreover, as some of the potential combinations 
are difficult to motivate, an exhaustive treatment is not worthwhile. In this paper we try to bring out 
some important differences between some [Page 457 ] of the approaches by examining three 
pair-wise comparisons that reflect the options most salient in the literature: 
 
i)  public preferences vs patient experience 
ii) public preferences vs professional judgements of capability 
iii) patient experience vs professional judgements of capability 
 
Having done this we will turn to the task of reconciliation. 
 
2. Public preference versus patient experience 
Dolan and Kahneman argue that evaluations should be experience-based rather than preference-
based on two main fronts. First, they point to decades of research (much by Kahneman and 
associates), that casts doubt on the reliability and stability of reported preferences. In particular, 
they emphasise the distorting influence of ‘focusing effects’. Asking someone to express a 
preference about a particular health condition (whether or not they have it) requires them to focus 
their attention on something that may in reality bother those people who have the condition for only 
a small portion of each day. Where this is the case, the respondent is likely to exaggerate its 
severity in her report. Second, they draw on a range of studies that show that people suffering from 
some conditions, including paraplegia and even tetraplegia, defy expectations: their reported 
happiness levels are not substantially lower than those of a control group of people without these 
conditions. These results suggest, of course, that there are some conditions to which patients are 
able to ‘adapt’.5 Interestingly, these similarities in experience persist whether the patient has 
acquired the condition since birth or was born with it.6 By contrast, members of the public express 
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 very different views from these patients. In one UK study of more than 1000 people who were 
asked how they would regard being ‘confined to a wheelchair for the rest of your life’ around 28% 
of people said that it would be as bad as death, and a further 24% regarded it as worse than 
death.7  
 
The paraplegia case involves a severe condition, but the public also ‘exaggerates’ in less severe 
conditions, such as osteoporosis.8  Other studies reveal cases where the difference goes in the 
other direction; that is, where the experience is worse than the public imagine. These cases may 
include mental illness, and chronic pain. And some conditions appear to cause ‘maladaptation’, 
where the patient experience becomes worse over time, not better.9 
 
Dolan and Kahneman use these findings to emphasise the discrepancy between what they call 
‘decision utility’ revealed by expressed preferences (whether of the public or patients), and 
‘experience utility’, elicited by day-reconstruction methods, in which patients log the quality of their 
experience during periods of the previous day. Two of our sets of distinctions are in play here: 
Dolan and Kahneman contrast experience-based measures to preference-based measures, and 
patient consultees to the general public, arguing in each case for the former.10 In other words, they 
reject both elements of the currently dominant public preference approach. 
 
Given the significant differences found in the studies to which we have referred, one would expect 
the policy implications of a decision to move from the current approach to an alternative patient 
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 See also Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein, and Christopher Jepson, ‘Whose quality of life? A 
commentary exploring discrepancies between health state evaluations of patients and the general public’, 
Quality of Life Research 12 (2003): 599–607 and D.G. Fryback, ‘Whose quality of life? Or whose decision?’, 
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 experience perspective to be significant. Dolan and Kahneman point out that one consequence 
would be a shift of resources towards mental health care and pain relief. But given fixed budgets, 
any ‘shift’ will entail a reduction elsewhere; presumably, on this approach, in those areas – such as 
physical disability - where most adaptation is observed. If adaptation is as thoroughgoing as it 
appears, it is arguable that far less should be spent to help patients overcome or avoid those 
conditions to which they can be expected to adapt.  
 
Suppose for example that a patient needs a life-saving operation. The surgeon can either perform 
a cheap procedure that leaves the patient with severe mobility problems, or a more expensive 
operation from which the patient can be expected to make a full physical recovery. Given the 
public’s aversion to mobility restrictions, the public preference approach is likely to support the 
expensive operation, while reports of (disabled) patient experience would shift the balance of 
opinion towards the cheaper operation. Hence the switch to experience measures would have 
significant effects (not all obviously welcome). As Dolan and Kahneman observe, ‘all else equal, if 
adaptation to one condition is more complete [Page 458 ] than to another, then the former will 
be given less priority than the latter’.11 Of course the ‘all else equal’ clause is vital. It may be 
expensive to provide the circumstances necessary for successful ‘adaptation’, and the transitional 
suffering often experienced by patients before adaptation is achieved must also be taken into 
account.  
 
There are other types of case, not involving adaptation, where we might also expect similar 
divergence.  With some kinds of mental dysfunction (including some Alzheimer’s cases), the 
patient’s experience is not unhappy, yet members of the public typically express a strong 
preference against the condition.  
 
In light of these cases it is worth thinking about the reasons for some of some of the public’s 
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 preferences: do they ‘exaggerate’ the badness of some experiences, or are they subscribers to the 
‘capability’ approach, preferring a life with fewer restrictions even if it does not guarantee a better 
subjective experience?12 We return to these issues below. 
 
3. Public preferences versus professional judgement of capability 
 
Within the philosophical literature capability measures were introduced partly in response to the 
very issue of adaptive preference.13 The ‘happy slave’ example shows why subjective reports of 
well-being or the expression of someone’s preferences might both be inadequate guides to value: 
even if a slave is happy, and prefers slavery to freedom, nevertheless, it is argued, he or she has 
real interests that are undermined by slavery. The notion of ‘capability’ puts flesh on the bones of 
‘real interest’; capabilities are, in Sen’s formulation, freedoms to ‘do’ certain valuable activities, or 
to ‘be’ a certain sort of person. Restricting one’s range of activities diminishes one’s capability. On 
such a view a disabled person is in one way like the slave, insofar as both are restricted in their 
activities. 
 
The issue of adaptation is not however directly germane to the comparison between public 
preferences and professional judgments of capability considered in the present section: it is 
patients who adapt, and our present comparison leaves the patient’s perspective out. For the 
purposes of this comparison, the question to consider is what differences one might expect 
between the public’s preferences concerning health states and capability-based ‘expert’ judgments 
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 Some data even suggests that accident victims are as ‘happy’ as lottery winners. P. Brickman, D. Coates, 
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‘A meta-analysis demonstrates no significant differences between patient and population preferences,’ 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 59 (2006): 653-664, although it is not clear that the results of the paper 
really do demonstrate what is claimed. 
 
 about the value of those states.14 As before, if there is no reason to think that there will be 
significant differences, then it does not matter for the purposes of policy which approach is used.  
 
Daniel Hausman provides examples to illustrate possible divergences between public and expert 
judgment: ‘Members of some social group might cherish impairments such as epilepsy as signs of 
divine favor. Their preferences would not be a good guide to their health’.15 Sceptics might dismiss 
this case as a typical philosopher’s fanciful example, with no bearing on actual policy. Yet there are 
similar real cases. It is easy to imagine that in a society where female circumcision or foot binding 
were prevalent, the public might rate the harm of these procedures (even in terms of health) lower 
than doctors.  It could turn out that on a public preference approach, these procedures would have 
to be regarded as improving health in that society. From a more ‘objective’ standpoint, this result is 
unfortunate.  
 
Hausman argues that a significant problem with preference-based methodology is that it solicits 
opinion about matters that should be investigated directly. ‘A preference ranking of health states 
depends on judgments concerning the character and consequences of health states, and it is as 
liable to be mistaken as the judgments upon which it depends. The evaluation of health states by 
an individual is a cognitively demanding task, to which preferences provide no shortcut’.16  
Hausman’s [Page 459 ] conclusion from this argument is not that we should, instead, rely on 
professionals, but rather that public consultation should be based on collective deliberation about 
the functional limitations and impact on experience of health conditions, rather than on the 
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 aggregation of individuals’ preferences. In the terms of this paper, Hausman’s view can, in part, be 
described as advocating public and patient deliberation on capabilities. Yet in a society in which 
foot binding is widespread, for example, it is not obvious that public joint deliberation on capabilities 
will fare any better than individualistic preference elicitation. 
 
Of course, we should not suppose that professionals will, in every case, transcend their cultural 
circumstances to deliver an ‘objective’ scientific judgement. A Catholic doctor might refuse to 
perform an abortion or a Jewish doctor overstate the health benefits of male circumcision. 
Nonetheless in general one would expect some divergence between public and expert judgment 
on some health-related matters, whether the public is deliberating individually or together, or 
expressing its preferences or its assessment of capabilities. 
 
Aside from the admittedly important ‘cultural’ cases such as foot binding and female circumcision, 
some studies suggest doctors tend to give lower values than the public in ranking some 
diseases.17 Other studies show differences in both directions. One pilot study, for example, found 
that doctors regarded schizophrenia less seriously than the general public, while at the same time 
placing greater weight on the adverse side-effects of treatment.18  
 
It is plausible to explain these discrepancies in terms of the difference in expertise of the 
consultees: as Hausman says, the judgment of health states is a cognitively demanding task, and 
members of the public are not especially informed about these states. Is the solution, then, to 
provide the public with all relevant details about various health states before they are asked to 
express their preferences? Once they are fully informed, one might think, their preferences will 
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 Tina T. Lee, Jennifer K. Ziegler, Roger Sommi, Catherine Sugar, Ramy Mahmoud and Leslie A. Lenert, 
‘Comparison of preferences for health outcomes in schizophrenia among stakeholder groups’, Journal of 
Psychiatric Research, 34 (2000): 201-210. 
 
 better match the judgements of professionals. But this may be too optimistic: we cannot assume 
that members of the public will absorb information easily, or be disposed to believe it if it goes 
against their long held beliefs, or to use it judiciously even if they accept it. Indeed some data 
suggest that, surprisingly, when the public is ‘informed’, its estimates of utility fall even further 
below those of their doctors.19  
 
4. Patient experience versus professional judgment of capability 
 
In this section we explore the possible divergence between doctor and patient perspectives on 
health. This is a familiar phenomenon in everyday life, and formal studies confirm it. For example, 
Jachuk et al. compared assessments of the quality of life of patients undergoing antihypertensive 
treatment from three groups of people: the patients themselves, their companions, and their 
doctors. The patients’ rating was lower than the doctors and the authors, rather dismissively, 
suggest that one reason for this may be the patients’ ‘lack of insight into their own problems’.20  
 
As one might predict, where differences are found between doctors’ and patients’ views of various 
health states and medical interventions, they suggest that patients are more concerned with the 
illness experience, while doctors pay more attention to physiological impairment. In the treatment 
of arthritis, for example, one study showed that doctors thought joint replacements were the closest 
thing to a ‘cure’, while patients were less enthusiastic and preferred to try other less invasive 
treatments.21 Furthermore, over time doctors will see certain aspects of health conditions as 
'normal' within a patient population since they see them all the time. This sometimes specifically 
includes pain to which they become desensitized.22 
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The growing body of ‘illness literature’ lends qualitative support to this divergence. Arthur Frank 
recounts his experiences of heart attack and cancer, and laments the narrow focus of most 
physicians.23 This raises the difficult question, of course, of precisely what an experience-based 
approach should include; but even with quite a restricted definition, it is clear from numerous 
patient’s accounts that their sense of what matters is frequently quite different from their doctor’s.    
 
As we saw earlier, the divergence between the experience and capability perspectives shows up in 
cases of disability (such as blindness, deafness or paraplegia). These obviously limit capability, but 
they do not always affect patients’ reports of their happiness. The choice of one of these 
approaches rather than the other in these cases makes a significant difference to the evaluation of 
the relevant medical interventions. Another type of case where divergence will show up is where 
subjective [Page 460 ] experience is poor, even though the patient’s other functionings are not 
impaired: clinical depression and chronic fatigue are examples of this type. 
 
5. Are Any of the Perspectives Dispensable? 
 
We have examined some cases where the perspectives of the general public, patients and 
professionals differ, and it is also clear that judgments based on preferences, experiences and 
capabilities will sometimes diverge. The next question to consider is whether any of these 
perspectives can be dismissed. Is each of them strictly relevant to the formulation of health policy? 
 
It would seem perverse to think that policy makers could dismiss as irrelevant either the 
perspective of patients, or that of professionals (especially doctors). Patients indisputably possess 
some special knowledge: of how things feel, and how a health condition impacts on life. Doctors 
also have special knowledge: of clinical evidence, and of how the body works. Health states are 
not just a matter of present experience; in many cases they also determine the future. Just as an 
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 engineer can point to risks and stresses within a system, which may not be having any present 
impact, so too can doctors. Medical expertise includes the range of future health possibilities and 
probabilities, such as whether a condition may deteriorate or create new needs in the future. 
 
If the perspectives of patient and doctor are both valuable for their particular insights, it is less easy 
to see why this should also be true of the general public. Why should we think the public 
perspective important, if it lacks both experience and knowledge? It is ironic that current measures 
rely almost exclusively on eliciting the preferences of the public, when intuitively it seems to be the 
least authoritative group. There are at least two important questions here. First, does the public 
have any special insight relevant to the evaluation of health interventions? Second, is there any 
reason to take their views seriously, even if they lack special insight? 
 
To start with the first question, there is no doubt that the public understanding of what it is like to 
live with a condition is often poor. Where the divergence between the public’s and the patient’s 
view can be explained by such ignorance, there is good reason to dismiss the public view. In the 
cases of mental illness and chronic pain, for example, the patient perspective, whether experience 
or preference based, tends to rate these conditions as more severe than the public preference 
approach. The public perspective can be assumed to be ‘ignorant’ here, as thankfully only a 
minority of people experience serious mental illness, or chronic pain (indeed it is often claimed that 
human beings have a poor memory for pain). In this case there seems no reason to retain the 
public perspective; indeed, one would expect a member of public to ‘correct’ her view in the light of 
further knowledge about the experience of these conditions. 
 
Yet, in other cases it is plausible to think disagreement can survive the acquisition of more 
knowledge about patient experience. One might become aware, for example, of the success with 
which many patients adapt to restrictions on their mobility, without this affecting her own strong 
preference not to lose her own mobility. Such concern can be psychologically robust, even in the 
 face of full information.24  
 
This divergence might reflect the public’s view that, for some health conditions,  patient experience 
does not capture everything important. From an external point of view one can have reason to 
value some conditions above others even if they are not correlated with greater subjective well-
being. As in the ‘happy slave’ case, the existence of choice, freedom and opportunity seems to 
matter.  Physical immobility reduces one’s set of options and even if this still leaves enough scope 
to lead as satisfying as life as one might have done otherwise, people will in advance usually prefer 
not to have their options reduced. One’s range of choice seems itself to be of value and, 
furthermore, individuals know that they have chosen their present options in the light of the 
constraints obtaining at that time. Even if they know that they could be satisfied with another 
(narrower) set of options, from their present point of view that set will appear second best. 
However ‘complete’ an adapted life may be in terms of experience, it may still be second best from 
the point of view of preference.   
 
Thus an awareness of patients’ adaptive abilities, and a degree of scepticism about the patient’s 
perspective both appear to be warranted: the public preference view has a claim to be retained 
insofar as it expresses something important that the ‘adapted’ perspective overlooks.  
 
Another factor often cited in the explanation of the divergence between public and patient 
perspectives is fear. As Dolan and White point out, public health is not only concerned with health 
states, but also with anxiety about health states (which also affects other aspects of individual well-
being, and shows up in such things as consumption patterns).25 The studies reporting public 
preference against physical immobility relative to other conditions do not seek to explain the 
results, but we might speculate that the prospect of major disability arouses great fear. For some 
people the fear of illness [Page 461 ] goes well beyond concern about the intrinsic nature of the 
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 condition, and includes concerns such as the response of other people.26 
 
One response to the impact of prospective anxiety is to point out that it is not itself part of the 
health state that policy makers are attempting to measure: ‘accounting for fear is quite separate 
from accounting for the real losses from a given health state’.27 But it does not necessarily follow 
that one should discount it; after all, fear/anxiety is a dimension of health (and included on the EQ-
5D scale) and, especially in its consequences on health-related behaviour, it can become relevant 
to health policy. It is worth noting too that, from the start, an argument used in favour of 
establishing the UK NHS was that it would reduce the anxiety attaching to illness, and especially 
people’s associated ‘money worries’.28 
 
Finally, we need to consider whether, even if the public perspective does not provide any special 
insight, nevertheless, there might be reason to give it weight. A point often raised is that in a tax or 
insurance system of health, the people paying for health care are ordinary citizens, many of whom 
do not fall seriously ill. It might be claimed that those who pay have a right to determine how their 
money is spent.29 Yet, as Nord argues, it seems wrong for policy makers to respect the views of 
the general population where they are based on beliefs that are demonstrably false.30 Arguably, 
the political concern about how the public likes to see its money spent should not impinge on the 
empirical question of how best to measure the benefits of health interventions. 
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 5. Reconciling these approaches? 
 
It seems that there is something to be said in favour of each of public preference, patient 
experience and professional assessment of capabilities (as well as other perspectives we have 
touched on, such as public deliberation about capabilities). How, then, should we respond in 
specific cases of divergence? Each perspective has advantages and disadvantages; if none can 
be ignored, yet - for the same reason - none can be chosen as the only approach to evaluation, the 
obvious thought is that we should try to include all of them.  
 
Despite the differences between the approaches, there is some promising common ground. To see 
this, let us assume, for example, that one is persuaded of the capability approach and attempts to 
think through how it may be implemented. In the standard philosophical presentation of the 
capability approach it is, of course, necessary to make a list of relevant capabilities. For most 
philosophers ‘health’ is itself merely a single category of capabilities, among many others, such as 
affiliation, control over the environment, and emotional well-being, which form part of a list that is 
either open-ended, as in Sen31 or determinate, as in Nussbaum.32 Hence a health capability 
approach will need a more fine-grained list of health related capabilities. Furthermore, it is typically 
part of the philosophical understanding of the capability approach that the different capabilities are, 
in some respects, incommensurable, at least in the sense that lack of one capability cannot always 
be compensated for by more of another. If this feature is retained then the capability approach 
immediately disqualifies itself as a possible basis for assisting decision making between scarce 
resources in health care, insofar as such decisions require quantitative comparisons. Of course, 
that could be a reason for a very radical change of methodology, but as long as we remain within 
existing frameworks what will be needed is not so much an application of the capability approach 
as a modification. 
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 How might that modification go? First a particular list of ‘health capabilities’ will be needed, and 
second, the elements on that list will have to be given values. But, in fact, the standard 
methodology – the EQ-5D scheme – does exactly this. As we noted that scheme analyses health 
into three levels of severity along the five dimensions of health: ‘mobility’; ‘self-care’; ‘usual 
activities’; ‘pain/discomfort’; and ‘anxiety/depression’. While the primary motivation for analyzing 
health into five dimensions is not an explicit endorsement of the capability approach but for 
pragmatic or instrumental reasons (indeed devices like EQ-5D are referred to as ‘instruments’), 
nevertheless, if we are looking for a health-related capability account that can actually be used to 
inform resource allocation decisions, something like the EQ-5D scale, even though it is some 
distance from a pure capability measure, is not a bad starting point.33 
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The next step, however, is to consider how those points on the matrix are to be valued. Although 
the standard methodology currently bases valuation on public preferences, the capability 
methodology typically (although not exclusively) consults professionals, to evaluate health states. 
The difference between the professional and public perspectives, we saw, can depend on a 
number of factors, such as the level of professional knowledge, as well as differing judgments 
about what is important about health. But it appears that the capability approach can use the health 
dimensions set out in EQ-5D as the basis for creating its own ‘instrument’ where valuations of 
dimensions are supplied by doctors. 
 
And, indeed, we can also see that not only can the public preference, and professional capability 
perspectives use the EQ-5D instrument, so can the experience perspective. The five dimensions of 
EQ-5D are all either aspects of a patient’s experience, or will affect their experience, and so a 
patient can give valuations to each dimension, by considering what trade-offs between different 
experiences he or she would be prepared to make. It seems, on the evidence considered so far, 
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 that patients will consider the dimensions of ‘mobility’ and ‘usual activities’ less serious relative to 
their valuation of ‘pain/discomfort’ and ‘anxiety/depression’ than members of the public and at least 
some professionals. (It is unclear how ‘self-care’ would be rated.) 
 
In sum, there can be broad agreement about analyzing health states in terms of the EQ-5D 
instrument, whether one starts from a commitment to preferences, experience or capabilities. 
However, when it comes to putting weights on the different dimensions, it seems likely that the 
different perspectives of public, patient and professional will generate different judgments, at least 
sometimes. In practice, then, we may find ourselves with cases where there is convergence 
between all three groups’ approaches to valuation, cases where two converge and one is out of 
step, and - theoretically at least - cases where the three groups give three different judgments. So, 
while we cannot dispense with any of the three perspectives entirely, we do have a way of drawing 
them into a single framework, within which we can theorize the differences.  
 
It looks then as if the different approaches to measurement can agree that the EQ-5D captures the 
important dimensions of health, but will differ in their final judgements about the value of different 
health states. And, as we have noted, this disagreement has serious consequences for priority 
setting. How, then, do we reduce disagreement? 
 
In principle, we can divide cases into those where one (or more) perspective is mistaken in some 
way, and deserves to be removed or modified, and those where each are valid and reflect an 
understandable difference of assessment. So, for example, it may be that patients sometimes 
‘over-adapt’ to their condition, and at least some adjustment should be made to their valuations. 
Equally, professionals and members of the public may lack experience of the phenomenology of a 
condition, and as a result become over-optimistic in their assessments. In other cases patient 
experience and professional evaluation may simply emphasise different aspects of a condition in 
different ways. In practice, therefore, we are left with two questions. First, how can we decide 
whether a divergent perspective is what we can call legitimate (in the sense of not being based on 
faulty reasoning),  and second, how do we deal with divergent legitimate perspectives? 
  
To the first question it would be tempting to try to seek an epistemological principle that would rule 
out illegitimate assessments. However it is unlikely that any such principle could be found, or, at 
least, command general assent. Nevertheless there will be what we might think of as ‘warning 
signs’: the possibility that a perspective may be based on over-adaptation or ignorance. How, then, 
do we move from here? To avoid arbitrarily privileging of one group over another, or simple 
averaging, which has no apparent theoretical justification, we propose, in effect, bringing 
representatives of all three groups together and shutting them in a room to deliberate until a 
consensus is somehow reached.  
 
Indeed this is roughly what the DALY (disability adjusted life year) methodology already does, or at 
least simulates .34 In calibrating values for the DALY WHO convened an 'expert panel' comprising 
health care providers. However, they did so not because they could give more 'objective' values of 
capability (although they do try to come up with such a set) but to save time educating others such 
as patients and the public on how to do the trade-offs. They thought that an educated public could 
have derived a similar set of valuations just as well and they were especially keen to establish a 
set of common values which could be used across different cultural settings. The healthcare 
providers were also explicitly instructed to take different perspectives (including the patient's and 
the public's) and to reconcile any differences before giving an answer just in order to reach a 
consensus on common values which is presumed to be an objective indicator of 'social 
preferences' or what the average individual would prefer. This may combine and so hide all sorts of 
differences between experience, preference and capability measures, and could result in an ad 
hoc and unclear combination of perspectives, or alternatively, we hope, provide a model of a type 
of deliberative process. 
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 While the DALY is too crude, in making too few distinctions, to use in health priority setting (as 
distinct from estimating the global burden of disease) its deliberative basis is very useful. Our 
modification, however, is to reserve deliberation for a second stage of assessment. That is, in a 
first stage the EQ-5D would be used to elicit separate QALY values from each of the public, 
patients and professionals according to variants of the standard methodology. If the resulting 
values are close, then no further work is needed. If, however, there are significant divergences, we 
recommend that a deliberative meeting is convened in which representatives of the three groups 
discuss and attempt to defend their reasons for valuing the states as they do. It is possible – this is 
an experimental question on which research is needed – that such deliberation can reduce 
disagreement. If it reduces it to manageable bounds then the problem is solved. 
 
But suppose significant disagreement remains. This could either be because ignorance or over-
adaptation is so deep that it cannot be shifted, or because the different perspectives are each 
legitimate. In practice we cannot distinguish these cases if deliberation does not reduce 
disagreement. What should then be done? Our tentative proposal is that in the case of 
disagreement the lowest valuation should be used; i.e. the one that rates the health condition as 
most serious. A justification for this, at first sight, is ‘consequence of error’. It is better to fund a 
treatment that should not be funded than to fail to fund a treatment that should be. 
 
However, the picture is more complex. For if we are making allocations from a fixed budget then 
any decision to fund a contested treatment will draw resources away from elsewhere: in effect from 
treatments that would have been just on the threshold of cost-effectiveness if the new treatment 
had not been funded. If there are many contested treatments then, in effect, this could have a 
serious impact. However, this is always a problem when a decision is made to fund a new 
treatment: the money for that treatment must come from somewhere. Nevertheless, we feel that 
our proposal is the least imperfect way of dealing with disagreement. And it remains an empirical 
question how much disagreement will in fact remain after deliberation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
  
We accept that there are good reasons to think that different approaches to the evaluation of 
health states can lead to different valuations, which sets a problem of which values to use for 
priority setting. Our approach has been, first, to propose that such disagreement can be modeled 
using the EQ-5D scale (or something like it) and second, that where disagreement exists it should 
be reduced, where possible, by deliberative methods. Where disagreement persists even after 
deliberation we suggest that policy makers give priority to the approach that considers the 
condition the most serious. Although not perfect, we feel that this is less imperfect that other 
possibilities. Further research is needed, however, on how to organize deliberation to best effect, 
and on its likely outcomes.35 
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